Joseph Greenberg

发表

Strong tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain

Shlomo Weber, Joseph Greenberg, J. Greenberg, 1986 .

Stable Coalition Structures with a Unidimensional Set of Alternatives

Shlomo Weber, Joseph Greenberg, 1993 .

The Theory of Social Situations: An Alternative Game-Theoretic Approach

Joseph Greenberg, J. Greenberg, 1990 .

Avoiding tax avoidance: A (repeated) game-theoretic approach

Joseph Greenberg, J. Greenberg, 1984 .

Some limitations of the groves-ledyard optimal mechanism

N. Tideman, Joseph Greenberg, R. Mackay, 1977 .

Deriving strong and coalition-proof nash equilibria from an abstract system

Joseph Greenberg, Joseph Greenberg, J. Greenberg, 1989 .

An application of the theory of social situations to repeated games

Joseph Greenberg, Joseph Greenberg, J. Greenberg, 1989 .

Payoffs in generalized sequential bargaining games

Joseph Greenberg, 1988 .

Waiving and Exercising Rights in the Theory of Social Situations

Joseph Greenberg, M. Hees, D. Kelsey, 2018 .

On the sensitivity of von Neumann and Morgenstern abstract stable sets: The stable and the individual stable bargaining set

Joseph Greenberg, J. Greenberg, 1992 .

MULTISTAGE SITUATIONS .

Dov Monderer, Benyamin Shitovitz, Joseph Greenberg, 2002 .