Taiki Todo

发表

Optimal false-name-proof single-item redistribution mechanisms

Makoto Yokoo, Shunsuke Tsuruta, Masaaki Oka, 2014, AAMAS.

Analysis of Incentive Ratio in Top-Trading-Cycles Algorithms

Taiki Todo, Taiki Todo, 2019 .

False-Name-Proof Locations of Two Facilities: Economic and Algorithmic Approaches

Makoto Yokoo, Taiki Todo, Akihisa Sonoda, 2016, AAAI.

Coexistence of utilitarian efficiency and false-name-proofness in social choice

Makoto Yokoo, Taiki Todo, Julien Lesca, 2014, AAMAS.

Characterization of Strategy-Proof, Revenue Monotone Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms and Connection with False-Name-Proofness

Makoto Yokoo, Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, 2009, WINE.

Strategy-Proof and Non-Wasteful Multi-Unit Auction via Social Network

Makoto Yokoo, Taiki Todo, Seiji Takanashi, 2019, AAAI.

False-name-proofness in online mechanisms

Makoto Yokoo, Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, 2012, AAMAS.

Characterizing false-name-proof allocation rules in combinatorial auctions

Makoto Yokoo, Taiki Todo, Yuko Sakurai, 2009, AAMAS.

False-Name-Proofness in Facility Location Problem on the Real Line

Makoto Yokoo, Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, 2010, WINE.

Social Decision with Minimal Efficiency Loss: An Automated Mechanism Design Approach

Makoto Yokoo, Hong Shen, Taiki Todo, 2015, AAMAS.

Predicting Own Action: Self-Fulfilling Prophecy Induced by Proper Scoring Rules

Makoto Yokoo, Masaaki Oka, Taiki Todo, 2014, HCOMP.

False-name-proof Combinatorial Auction Design via Single-minded Decomposition

Makoto Yokoo, Taiki Todo, Dengji Zhao, 2014, ECAI.

Characterization of false-name-proof social choice mechanisms

Taiki Todo, Taiki Todo, 2010, AAMAS.

Mechanism Design with Uncertainty

Taiki Todo, Taiki Todo, 2020, IJCAI.

Strategy-Proof Cake Cutting Mechanisms for All-or-Nothing Utility

Makoto Yokoo, Shunsuke Tsuruta, Taiki Todo, 2015, PRIMA.

Manipulation-resistant facility location mechanisms for ZV-line graphs

Makoto Yokoo, Taiki Todo, Ilan Nehama, 2018, AAMAS.

False-name-proof mechanism design without money

Makoto Yokoo, Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, 2011, AAMAS.

Worst-case efficiency ratio in false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms

Vincent Conitzer, Makoto Yokoo, Taiki Todo, 2010, AAMAS.

Manipulations in Two-Agent Sequential Allocation with Random Sequences

Makoto Yokoo, Taiki Todo, Yuto Tominaga, 2016, AAMAS.

Individually Rational Strategy-Proof Social Choice with Exogenous Indifference Sets

Makoto Yokoo, Taiki Todo, Mingyu Guo, 2016, PRIMA.

Generalizing Envy-Freeness toward Group of Agents

Makoto Yokoo, Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, 2011, IJCAI.

Exchange of Indivisible Objects with Asymmetry

Makoto Yokoo, Taiki Todo, Hideaki Hata, 2015, IJCAI.

Characterization of Revenue Monotonicity in Combinatorial Auctions

Makoto Yokoo, Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, 2010, 2010 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology.

Cake Cutting for All-or-Nothing Utility

Makoto Yokoo, Taiki Todo, Yuko Sakurai, 2017 .

A Complexity Approach for Core-Selecting Exchange with Multiple Indivisible Goods under Lexicographic Preferences

Makoto Yokoo, Taiki Todo, Julien Lesca, 2015, AAAI.

Strategyproof Exchange with Multiple Private Endowments

Makoto Yokoo, Haixin Sun, Taiki Todo, 2014, AAAI.

Split Manipulations in Cost Sharing of Minimum Cost Spanning Tree

Makoto Yokoo, Taiki Todo, M. Yokoo, 2020, ECAI.

Facility Location Games With Fractional Preferences

Makoto Yokoo, Minming Li, Taiki Todo, 2018, AAAI.

Characteristics of Sustainable OSS Projects: A Theoretical and Empirical Study

Ken-ichi Matsumoto, Taiki Todo, Hideaki Hata, 2015, 2015 IEEE/ACM 8th International Workshop on Cooperative and Human Aspects of Software Engineering.

A Complexity Approach for Core-Selecting Exchange under Conditionally Lexicographic Preferences

Makoto Yokoo, Taiki Todo, Julien Lesca, 2018, J. Artif. Intell. Res..

Characterizing Strategy-proof, Revenue Monotone Allocation Rules in Auction Mechanisms

Makoto Yokoo, Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, 2011 .

Efficiency in Truthful Auctions via a Social Network pdf

Makoto Yokoo, Taiki Todo, Seiji Takanashi, 2019, ArXiv.

Rename and False-Name Manipulations in Discrete Facility Location with Optional Preferences

Makoto Yokoo, Taiki Todo, Tomohiro Ono, 2017, PRIMA.

SAT-Based Automated Mechanism Design for False-Name-Proof Facility Location

Makoto Yokoo, Taiki Todo, Nodoka Okada, 2019, PRIMA.

Service Exchange Problem

Taiki Todo, Julien Lesca, 2018, IJCAI.

False-name-proof matching

Vincent Conitzer, Taiki Todo, Taiki Todo, 2013, AAMAS.

VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism: general framework for constructing iterative combinatorial auction mechanisms

Makoto Yokoo, Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, 2013, AAMAS.

Competitive Auctions and Envy-Freeness for Group of Agents

Makoto Yokoo, Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, 2019, COCOON.

False-Name-Proof Facility Location on Discrete Structures

Makoto Yokoo, Taiki Todo, Nodoka Okada, 2019, ECAI.

Fairness and False-Name Manipulations in Randomized Cake Cutting

Makoto Yokoo, Shunsuke Tsuruta, Masaaki Oka, 2015, AAMAS.

Parametric Mechanism Design via Quantifier Elimination

Makoto Yokoo, Hirokazu Anai, Taiki Todo, 2015, AAMAS.

Strategy-proof Cake Cutting Mechanisms for All-or-nothing Utility

Makoto Yokoo, Shunsuke Tsuruta, Taiki Todo, 2018, Fundam. Informaticae.

Facility Location with Variable and Dynamic Populations

Makoto Yokoo, Taiki Todo, Tomohiro Ono, 2018, AAMAS.

New Algorithms for Japanese Residency Matching

Makoto Yokoo, Taiki Todo, Zhaohong Sun, 2021, IJCAI.

Lazy Gale-Shapley for Many-to-One Matching with Partial Information

Makoto Yokoo, Taiki Todo, Kentaro Yahiro, 2021, ADT.

Mechanism Design for Housing Markets over Social Networks

Makoto Yokoo, Taiki Todo, Takehiro Kawasaki, 2021, AAMAS.

Fair Pairwise Exchange among Groups

Toby Walsh, Taiki Todo, Zhaohong Sun, 2021, IJCAI.

Two Case Studies for Trading Multiple Indivisible Goods with Indifferences

Makoto Yokoo, Taiki Todo, Akihisa Sonoda, 2014, AAAI.