Yu Zhou

发表

Menu Mechanisms

Andrew Mackenzie, Yu Zhou, 2020, J. Econ. Theory.

Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency for Non-Quasi-Linear Common-Tiered-Object Preferences: Characterization of Minimum Price Rule

Yu Zhou, Shigehiro Serizawa, 2016 .

Disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry

Lijun Ma, Bo Chen, Yu Zhou, 2020 .

Disclosure Policies in All-pay Auctions with Bid Caps and Stochastic Entry

Lijun Ma, Bo Chen, Yu Zhou, 2019, SSRN Electronic Journal.

A multi-item auction with budget-constrained bidders and price controls ☆

Yu Zhou, 2017 .

A characterization of the Vickrey rule in slot allocation problems

Y. Chun, Yu Zhou, Shigehiro Serizawa, 2021, International Journal of Economic Theory.

International factor mobility, environmental pollution and skilled–unskilled wage inequality in developing countries

Yu Zhou, Lijun Pan, 2013 .

Fair Allocation of Indivisible Chores: Beyond Additive Costs

B. Li, Yu Zhou, Fangxia Wang, 2022, 2205.10520.

Fair Allocation of Indivisible Chores: Beyond Additive Valuations

B. Li, Yu Zhou, Fangxia Wang, 2022, ArXiv.

Competitive Equilibria in Matching Models with Financial Constraints

Yu Zhou, P. Herings, Yu Zhou, 2019, International Economic Review.

Multi-object auction design beyond quasi-linearity: Leading examples

Yu Zhou, Shigehiro Serizawa, 2023, Games Econ. Behav..

Equilibria in Matching Markets with Soft and Hard Liquidity Constraints

P. Herings, Yu Zhou, 2021, SSRN Electronic Journal.

Serial Vickrey Mechanism

Yu Zhou, Shigehiro Serizawa, Yu Zhou, 2020 .

Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: Characterization of minimum price rule

Yu Zhou, Shigehiro Serizawa, Yu Zhou, 2018, Games Econ. Behav..

Serial Vickrey mechanism1

Yu Zhou, Shigehiro Serizawa, 2020 .

On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion

H. Moulin, R. Velez, Yves Sprumont, 2023 .