Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness

This paper studies the strategic manipulation of set-valued social choice functions according to Kelly’s preference extension, which prescribes that one set of alternatives is preferred to another if and only if all elements of the former are preferred to all elements of the latter. It is shown that set-monotonicity—a new variant of Maskin-monotonicity—implies Kelly-strategyproofness in comprehensive subdomains of the linear domain. Interestingly, there are a handful of appealing Condorcet extensions—such as the top cycle, the minimal covering set, and the bipartisan set—that satisfy set-monotonicity even in the unrestricted linear domain, thereby answering questions raised independently by Barberà (J Econ Theory 15(2):266–278(1977a)) and Kelly (Econometrica 45(2):439–446 (1977)).

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