Tamper detection for safeguards and treaty monitoring: Fantasies, realities, and potentials

Tamper detection 2 has an important role to play in domestic nuclear security and safeguards, as well as in international verification and treaty monitoring. Unfortunately, ideas about tamper detection often seem to be based on misconceptions, fuzzy goals, and wishful thinking. Current tamper detection programs are hampered by these problems, as well as by poor training, limited analysis, vague (or nonexistent) standards, “see-no-evil” mentality, “one-size-fitsall” thinking, and unmitigated vulnerabilities. Better approaches, more sophistication, improved hardware, and greater understanding are sorely needed for both current and future applications.

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