A framework for evaluating risk to the transportation network from terrorism and security policies

Examining the risk imposed on the transportation network by both security policies and terrorist activity is critical to understanding higher-level risks, such as those related to national security and the economy. This paper presents a framework for evaluating risk to the road transportation network from direct targeting by terrorists, collateral damage, and pre-attack and post-attack security policies. Risk is measured in terms of capacity losses between an origin and a destination. An event tree determines the probabilities that the network's links are in particular states. The maximum flow between the OD pair, subtracted from the maximum flow of the baseline network, determines the consequences, or impact. Using this framework, decision-makers can better evaluate the costs of both terrorist activities and security measures, including the risk of reacting to false intelligence.

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