New Product Preannouncing Behavior: A Market Signaling Study

The authors describe an exploratory study of the preannouncement of new products in advance of market introduction. The basic premise taken is that preannouncement is a marketing manifestation of signaling. The focus is on identifying conditions that are likely to induce firms to preannounce new product introductions. A survey of managers explores the incidence and rationale for preannouncement. Results suggest that constructs such as market dominance, company size, attractiveness of the competitive environment, and customer switching costs can provide good explanations for preannouncing behavior.

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