Information, decision-making and deception in games

Modeling deception in a real-world conflict situation is usually difficult. For a better understanding, we study deception through a fundamental relationship between information and decision-making. Under a probabilistic framework, we consider a zero-sum game with an asymmetrical structure, where player 1 receives additional information and player 2 has the potential to inject deception. We derive accuracy conditions on the information obtained by player 1, which can lead to a better decision. The feasibility of deception is further explored, which is conditioned on the quality of deceptive signals generated by player 2. We classify deception into passive and active deception.

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