TPAHS: A Truthful and Profit Maximizing Double Auction for Heterogeneous Spectrums

In recent years, the auction has been widely applied in wireless communications for spectrum allocation, so that spectrum owners can lease their unutilized spectrum to secondary users. Both primary users and secondary users can get benefit from the auction. Moreover, the spectrum utilization is improved. Existing auction mechanisms either do not consider the heterogeneity of spectrums or pay little attention to the auction's economic efficiency. In this paper, we propose a Truthful and Profit maximizing double Auction for Heterogeneous Spectrums (TPAHS), which simultaneously considers spectrum heterogeneity and economic efficiency. Moreover, different from the most existing spectrum auction mechanisms which are based on interference graph, we consider a more realistic SINR (Signal-to-Interference-plus-Noise Ratio) model. We prove that TPAHS is truthful, individual-rational, budget-balanced and the experiments show that TPAHS improves the auctioneer's profit significantly.

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