If only I could sack you! Management turnover and performance in Great German Banks between 1874 and 1913

We analyse the relation of firm performance and managerial turnover in 19th century German banking by probit estimation. This period covers a major reform of corporate governance. Before the reform performance and turnover were unrelated, whereas after the reform more successful managers left firms more seldom. However, only short-run performance matters in this turnover–success relationship.

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