A Game-Theoretic Approach to Share the Costs of Cooperating Healthcare Networks

The growing demand for healthcare services combined with the disarray in the health insurance market in the United States has created a situation where rival health networks are aggressively competing by building duplicate health facilities and providing redundant services in localized geographic regions. Unfortunately, this strategy can reduce the quality of patient care and decrease profits (Kaissi & Charland, 2013). A solution to this problem is for health networks to cooperate and share healthcare equipment, facilities, and personnel. Toward that end, this paper presents a game-theoretic method that can share these costs in a fair, efficient, and repeatable manner.

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