How the initial level of visibility and limited resource affect the evolution of cooperation

This work sheds important light on how the initial level of visibility and limited resource might affect the evolution of the players’ strategies under different network structure. We perform the prisoner’s dilemma game in the lattice network and the scale-free network, the simulation results indicate that the average density of death in lattice network decreases with the increases of the initial proportion of visibility. However, the contrary phenomenon is observed in the scale-free network. Further results reflect that the individuals’ payoff in lattice network is significantly larger than the one in the scale-free network. In the lattice network, the visibility individuals could earn much more than the invisibility one. However, the difference is not apparent in the scale-free network. We also find that a high Successful-Defection-Payoff (SDB) and a rich natural environment have relatively larger deleterious cooperation effects. A high SDB is beneficial to raising the level of visibility in the heterogeneous network, however, that has adverse visibility consequences in homogeneous network. Our result reveals that players are more likely to cooperate voluntarily under homogeneous network structure.