Explaining Leakage of Public Funds

Using panel data from a unique survey of public primary schools in Uganda, The authors assess the degree of leakage of public funds in education. The survey data reveal that on average during 1991-95 schools received only 13 percent of the central government's allocation for the schools'nonwage expenditures. Most of the allocated funds were used by public officials for purposes unrelated to education or captured for private gain (leakage). The survey data also reveal large variations in leakage across schools. A small set of school-specific variables can explain a significant part of this variation. Specifically, the authors find that larger schools receive a larger share of the intended funds per student. Schools with children of wealthier parents also experience a lower degree of leakage, while schools with a higher share of unqualified teachers receive less. After addressing potential selection and measurement issues, the authors show that these school characteristics have a quantitatively large impact on the degree of leakage. The findings are consistent with the view that resource flows-and leakage-are endogenous to schools'sociopolitical endowment. Rather than being passive recipients of flows from government, schools use their bargaining power relative to other parts of government to secure greater shares of funding. Public resources are therefore not allocated according to the rules underlying the government's budget decisions, with obvious equity and efficiency implications. The survey findings had a direct impact on policy in Uganda. As evidence on the degree of leakage became public knowledge, the central government enacted a number of changes: it began publishing monthly transfers of public funds to the districts in newspapers, broadcasting them on radio, and requiring schools to post information on inflow of funds. An initial assessment of these reforms shows that the flow of funds improved dramatically, from 13 percent on average reaching schools in 1991-95 to around 90 percent in 1999. These improvements emphasize the role of information in mobilizing"voice"for better public expenditure outcomes.

[1]  R. Levine,et al.  A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-Country Growth Regressions , 1991 .

[2]  J. Svensson Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much , 2002 .

[3]  A. Hirschman,et al.  Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States , 1971 .

[4]  Rafael Di Tella,et al.  National Champions and Corruption: Some Unpleasant Interventionist Arithmetic , 1997 .

[5]  G. Tabellini,et al.  Electoral Rules and Corruption , 2001, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[6]  Rati Ram Government Size and Economic Growth: A New Framework and Some Evidence from Cross-Section and Time-Series Data: Reply , 1989 .

[7]  L. Pritchett,et al.  Sociability : Household Income and Social Capital in Rural Tanzania , 1999 .

[8]  J. Svensson Aid, Growth and Democracy , 1999 .

[9]  R. Reinikka,et al.  Coping with poor public capital , 2002 .

[10]  J. Hausman Specification tests in econometrics , 1978 .

[11]  Richard Blundell,et al.  An Exogeneity Test for a Simultaneous Equation Tobit Model with an Application to Labor Supply , 1986 .

[12]  Daniel Landau,et al.  Government and Economic Growth in the Less Developed Countries: An Empirical Study for 1960-1980 , 1986, Economic Development and Cultural Change.

[13]  Daniel Treisman,et al.  The causes of corruption: a cross-national study , 2000 .

[14]  D. Dollar,et al.  Aid, Policies, and Growth , 1997 .

[15]  Peter Boone,et al.  Politics and the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid , 1995 .

[16]  S. Rose-Ackerman THE ROLE OF WAGES AND AUDITING DURING A CRACKDOWN ON CORRUPTION IN THE CITY OF BUENOS AIRES * , 2003 .

[17]  Rafael Di Tella,et al.  Rents, Competition, and Corruption , 1999 .

[18]  E. Duflo Schooling and Labor Market Consequences of School Construction in Indonesia: Evidence from an Unusual Policy Experiment , 2000 .

[19]  J. Svensson Foreign aid and rent-seeking , 2000 .

[20]  Henrik Hansen,et al.  Aid and Growth Regressions , 2001 .

[21]  Roger C. Kormendi,et al.  Macroeconomic determinants of growth: Cross-country evidence , 1985 .

[22]  R. Reinikka Recovery in Service Delivery: Evidence from Schools and Health Centers , 2001 .

[23]  E. Miguel Ethnic Diversity and School Funding in Kenya , 2001 .

[24]  Richard Rogerson,et al.  Income Distribution, Communities, and the Quality of Public Education , 1996 .

[25]  Jakob Svensson,et al.  Are Corruption and Taxation Really Harmful to Growth? Firm-Level Evidence , 1999 .

[26]  P. Collier,et al.  Uganda's Recovery: The Role of Farms, Firms, and Government , 2001 .

[27]  Lant Pritchett,et al.  Mind Your P's and Q'S: The Cost of Public Investment is Not the Value of Public Capital , 1996 .

[28]  J. Stiglitz,et al.  The Political Economy of High and Low Growth , 1997 .