Psychological Perspectives on Nuclear Deterrence

INTRODUCTION 239 CORE PROPOSITIONS OF DETERRENCE THEORy 242 DETERMINANTS OF DETERRENCE SUCCESS AND FAILURE 244 Cognitive Pro cesse s.. . . ..... .. . .. ....... .. .. . . ... .. . ....... 245 Motivational Pro ce sses . 251 Small-Group Pro ce sse s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254 Institutional and Domestic Processe s . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255 Re�a�ionshif . betwee". Arms Races and Wars . 256 CriSIS De cIsIOn -Ma kin g. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257 SUBSUMING DETERRENCE THEORY INTO A GENERAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE 258 Pure Threat Strategies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258 Positive Indu cements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259 Mixed-Influence Strategies . ........ ; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... . . . 260 PUBLIC OPINION AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 265 SOURCES OF SKEPTICISM 267 The Impact of the Nuclear Revolution . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ......... . . . .. . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . 267 Reliance on Historical Counterfactuals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268 Hidden Pol itical A gendas and Value-Driven So cial Scien ce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269 Foreign Policy as Art . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269 CONCLUSION 270

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