A Framework for Approval-based Budgeting Methods

We define and study a general framework for approval-based budgeting methods and compare certain methods within this framework by their axiomatic and computational properties. Furthermore, we visualize their behavior on certain Euclidean distributions and analyze them experimentally.

[1]  David S. Johnson,et al.  Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness , 1978 .

[2]  John R. Chamberlin,et al.  Representative Deliberations and Representative Decisions: Proportional Representation and the Borda Rule , 1983, American Political Science Review.

[3]  U. Feige.  A threshold of ln n for approximating set cover , 1998, JACM.

[4]  Vijay V. Vazirani,et al.  Approximation Algorithms , 2001, Springer Berlin Heidelberg.

[5]  H. Wainwright.  Making A People's Budget In Porto Alegre , 2003 .

[6]  Y. Cabannes.  Participatory budgeting: a significant contribution to participatory democracy , 2004 .

[7]  Ariel D. Procaccia,et al.  On the complexity of achieving proportional representation , 2008, Soc. Choice Welf..

[8]  Jean-François Laslier,et al.  Handbook on approval voting , 2010 .

[9]  Craig Boutilier,et al.  Social Choice : From Consensus to Personalized Decision Making , 2011 .

[10]  H. Gilman.  Transformative Deliberations: Participatory Budgeting in the United States , 2012 .

[11]  Piotr Faliszewski,et al.  Properties of multiwinner voting rules , 2014, Social Choice and Welfare.

[12]  K. K,et al.  1 Budget Aggregation via Knapsack Voting : Welfare-maximization and Strategy-proofness , 2016 .

[13]  Piotr Faliszewski,et al.  Committee Scoring Rules: Axiomatic Classification and Hierarchy , 2016, IJCAI.

[14]  Piotr Faliszewski,et al.  Multiwinner analogues of the plurality rule: axiomatic and algorithmic perspectives , 2016, Social Choice and Welfare.

[15]  Ariel D. Procaccia,et al.  Subset Selection via Implicit Utilitarian Voting , 2016, IJCAI.

[16]  Nimrod Talmon,et al.  A Condorcet-Consistent Participatory Budgeting Algorithm , 2017 .

[17]  Ariel D. Procaccia,et al.  Preference Elicitation For Participatory Budgeting , 2017, AAAI.

[18]  Piotr Faliszewski,et al.  What Do Multiwinner Voting Rules Do? An Experiment Over the Two-Dimensional Euclidean Domain , 2017, AAAI.

[19]  Nimrod Talmon,et al.  Proportionally Representative Participatory Budgeting: Axioms and Algorithms , 2017, AAMAS.

[20]  Piotr Faliszewski,et al.  Between Proportionality and Diversity: Balancing District Sizes under the Chamberlin-Courant Rule , 2018, AAMAS.

[21]  Martin Lackner,et al.  Consistent Approval-Based Multi-Winner Rules , 2017, EC.

[22]  Piotr Faliszewski,et al.  Optimization-Based Voting Rule Design: The Closer to Utopia the Better , 2018, AAMAS.

[23]  Kamesh Munagala,et al.  Fair Allocation of Indivisible Public Goods , 2018, EC.

[24]  Piotr Faliszewski,et al.  Egalitarian Committee Scoring Rules , 2018, IJCAI.

[25]  Till Fluschnik,et al.  Fair Knapsack , 2017, AAAI.