Practical Split Manufacturing Optimization

Trojans and backdoors inserted by untrusted foundries have become serious threats to hardware security. Split manufacturing is proposed to hide important circuit structures and prevent Trojan insertion by fabricating partial interconnections in trusted foundries. Existing split manufacturing frameworks, however, usually lack security guarantee and suffer from poor scalability. It is observed that inserting dummy cells and wires can have a high potential for overcoming the security and scalability problems of existing methods, but it is not compatible with current security definition. In this chapter, two major questions are answered: when the insertion of dummy cells and wires is considered, (1) how to define the notion of security and (2) how to realize the required security level effectively and efficiently. With extensive experiments, the proposed framework demonstrates significantly better efficiency, overhead reduction, and security guarantee compared with the previous state of the art.

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