ENFORCEMENT OF HIGHWAY WEIGHT REGULATIONS: A GAME THEORETIC MODEL

Although there is extensive literature on the subject of weight regulation enforcement, an economic framework is generally lacking. It is generally accepted that the costs associated with complete compliance are excessive. At the same time, the nature of public highways is such that some level of enforcement is necessary. The theoretical model presented in this paper provides a strategic framework for analyzing the economic outcome of different levels of fines and enforcement efforts. The economic tools of "game theory" are used to model the conflict between truckers and the highway enforcement officials. The truckers have two choices: to comply with the law, or to overload their truck. The regulation enforcers also have two choices: they may have the scale open and weigh passing trucks, or they may close the scale. Assuming a randomized operation of scales and random overloading by truckers, the game theory model establishes the equilibrium level of weight regulation compliance, given a set of enforcement parameters. The paper begins with an overview of weight regulation enforcement and a review of the relevant literature. Subsequently, the game theory model is developed to estimate the equilibrium levels of enforcement and compliance. The paper concludes with a discussion of the model results and its implications for highway transport policy.