Hezbollah’s Global Tentacles: A Relational Approach to Convergence with Transnational Organized Crime

ABSTRACT That terrorists, criminals, and their facilitators exploit the global marketplace is well known. While the global movement of illicit goods is well documented, robust empirical evidence linking terrorism and organized crime remains elusive. This article posits Network Science as a means of making these links more apparent. As a critical case study, Hezbollah is quite possibly the most mature globalized terrorist organization, although it thinks of itself as the “Party of God.” However, the means seem to justify the ends: this article shows that Hezbollah’s holy men have no qualms about resorting to pornography, contraband cigarettes, immigration fraud, and credit card fraud to raise funds. Beyond establishing links, Social Network Analysis reveals other important characteristics, such as the relative autonomy from Hezbollah headquarters that local fundraising networks enjoy. That finding implies a paradigm shift: Hezbollah is no less a terrorist organization than an organized crime syndicate. This is apparent in a network’s structure. Transnational Organized Crime is typically about nodes being connected to many others in the network. Yet, Hezbollah fundraising networks allow such connectivity because of the group’s typically high levels of mutual trust and familial relationships. This creates a vulnerability that can be exploited by law enforcement and intelligence organizations.

[1]  A. Shapiro,et al.  National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism , 2010 .

[2]  N. Gilman,et al.  Deviant globalization : black market economy in the 21st century , 2011 .

[3]  Tamara Makarenko,et al.  The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism , 2004 .

[4]  Renée C. van der Hulst Terrorist Networks: The Threat of Connectivity , 2014 .

[5]  S. Koschade A Social Network Analysis of Jemaah Islamiyah: The Applications to Counter-Terrorism and Intelligence , 2006 .

[6]  Michael Miklaucic,et al.  Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization , 2013 .

[7]  M. Levitt Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon's Party of God , 2013 .

[8]  Carter T. Butts,et al.  Extended structures of mediation: Re-examining brokerage in dynamic networks , 2013, Soc. Networks.

[9]  Robert Fromme,et al.  Operation Smokescreen: A successful interagency collaboration: (409282008-005) , 2007 .

[10]  M. Deflem Dirty Entanglements: Corruption, Crime, and Terrorism , 2016 .

[11]  P. Duijn,et al.  The Relative Ineffectiveness of Criminal Network Disruption , 2014, Scientific Reports.

[12]  Chris Dishman,et al.  Terrorism, Crime, and Transformation , 2001 .

[13]  M. Sever,et al.  The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate: Funding Terrorism through Organized Crime, A Case Study , 2007 .

[14]  Sean F. Everton,et al.  Detecting significant changes in dark networks , 2013 .

[15]  Olivier Walther,et al.  Islamic Terrorism and the Malian Rebellion , 2015 .

[16]  Victor Asal,et al.  When Politicians Sell Drugs: Examining Why Middle East Ethnopolitical Organizations Are Involved in the Drug Trade , 2012 .

[17]  Kathleen M. Carley,et al.  Social Network Monitoring of Al-Qaeda , 2007 .

[18]  Michael Freeman,et al.  Terrorism Financing Methods: An Overview , 2013 .

[19]  Patricia E. Tweet Brokerage and Closure: An Introduction to Social Capital , 2006 .

[20]  Moisés Naím,et al.  Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats are Hijacking the Global Economy , 2005 .

[21]  Chris Dishman,et al.  The Leaderless Nexus: When Crime and Terror Converge , 2005 .

[22]  Katherine Zimmerman The Al Qaeda Network: A New Framework for Defining the Enemy , 2013 .

[23]  Brian Joseph Reed,et al.  Formalizing the Informal: A Network Analysis of an Insurgency , 2006 .

[24]  Michael P. Arena Hizballah's Global Criminal Operations , 2006 .

[25]  S. Hutchinson,et al.  A Crime–Terror Nexus? Thinking on Some of the Links between Terrorism and Criminality 1 , 2007 .

[26]  Luke M. Gerdes,et al.  Assessing the Abu Sayyaf Group's Strategic and Learning Capacities , 2014 .

[27]  Christian Leuprecht,et al.  Why Terror Networks are Dissimilar: How Structure Relates to Function , 2014 .

[28]  R. Burt Structural Holes and Good Ideas1 , 2004, American Journal of Sociology.

[29]  Eitan Azani,et al.  The Hybrid Terrorist Organization: Hezbollah as a Case Study , 2013 .

[30]  C. Stohl,et al.  Networks of Terror: Theoretical Assumptions and Pragmatic Consequences , 2007 .

[31]  Klaus von Lampe,et al.  Organized Crime and Trust:: On the conceptualization and empirical relevance of trust in the context of criminal networks , 2004 .

[32]  J. Raab,et al.  Powell (1990): Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization , 2018, Schlüsselwerke der Netzwerkforschung.

[33]  Valdis E. Krebs,et al.  Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells , 2001 .

[34]  Ronald S. Burt,et al.  Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition. , 1994 .

[35]  H. Jarrett Crime–terror alliances and the state: ethnonationalist and Islamist challenges to regional security , 2017 .

[36]  A. Perliger,et al.  Social Network Analysis in the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence , 2011, PS: Political Science & Politics.

[37]  Carlo Morselli,et al.  The Efficiency/Security Trade-Off in Criminal Networks , 2007, Soc. Networks.

[38]  H. Thorelli Networks: Between Markets and Hierarchies , 1986 .

[39]  Martin Rudner Hizbullah Terrorism Finance: Fund-Raising and Money-Laundering , 2010 .

[40]  C. Comet Ronald S. Burt: Brokerage and Closure: An Introduction to Social Capital. , 2007 .

[41]  J. Weinstein,et al.  Coethnicity: Diversity and the Dilemmas of Collective Action , 2009 .

[42]  Carlo Morselli,et al.  Assessing Vulnerable and Strategic Positions in a Criminal Network , 2010 .

[43]  Destabilizing networks , 2002 .

[44]  Boaz Ganor,et al.  The Infiltration of Terrorist Organizations Into the Pharmaceutical Industry: Hezbollah as a Case Study , 2013 .