Reducing Asset Substitution with Warrant and Convertible Debt Issue

The conflict between shareholders and bondholders in a levered firm over the choice of the risk level for firm assets is well-known. The original contingent claims approach to this issue had the firm reaching a critical point at the bond maturity date, similar to what happens at expiration of an option. In that model, equity is shown to be like a call option on the value of the firm. But the reality is that firms are continuously monitored by investors, customers and employees, and may potentially experience financial distress if the value of its assets Falls too low at any point in time. In this article, Chesney and Gibson present an alternative contingent claims analysis, in which equity is modeled as a down and out call, with an outstrike equal to the asset level that would precipitate distress. In this revised framework, they are able to study how the use of convertible debt, or debt with attached warrants, in place of straight debt affects the problem of volatility choice, and may perhaps eliminate the conflict of interest entirely.