Rent-Seeking and Property Rights Formation in the U.S. Atlantic Sea Scallop Fishery

This paper chronicles rent-seeking in the U.S. Atlantic sea scallop fishery, including its influence on property rights formation. Decades of lobbying by the U.S. fishing industry against foreign fishing and seafood imports caused Congress to extend federal jurisdiction to 200 miles in 1977. Scallop fishermen initially earned high profits for their efforts, but by about 1990 the overcapitalized fishery was surviving on new year classes. Limited access and a stock rebuilding program were introduced in 1994, but an asymmetric distribution of potential gains in favor of relatively few, multi-permit companies has preoccupied public debate on the transferability and consolidation of fishing rights. Rent-seeking by the limited-access permit holders is now also focused on claims by the growing open-access sector of the scallop fishery, groundfish bycatch limitations, and gear-induced habitat damage, which has drawn lawsuits from environmental organizations.

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