Pricing combinatorial markets for tournaments

In a prediction market, agents trade assets whose value is tied to a future event, for example the outcome of the next presidential election. Asset prices determine a probability distribution over the set of possible outcomes. Typically, the outcome space is small, allowing agents to directly trade in each outcome, and allowing a market maker to explicitly update asset prices. Combinatorial markets, in contrast, work to estimate a full joint distribution of dependent observations, in which case the outcome space grows exponentially. In this paper, we consider the problem of pricing combinatorial markets for single-elimination tournaments. With $n$ competing teams, the outcome space is of size 2n-1. We show that the general pricing problem for tournaments is P-hard. We derive a polynomial-time algorithm for a restricted betting language based on a Bayesian network representation of the probability distribution. The language is fairly natural in the context of tournaments, allowing for example bets of the form "team i wins game k". We believe that our betting language is the first for combinatorial market makers that is both useful and tractable. We briefly discuss a heuristic approximation technique for the general case.

[1]  David M. Pennock,et al.  The Real Power of Artificial Markets , 2001, Science.

[2]  Lance Fortnow,et al.  Betting on permutations , 2007, EC '07.

[3]  C. Plott,et al.  Efficiency of Experimental Security Markets with Insider Information: An Application of Rational-Expectations Models , 1982, Journal of Political Economy.

[4]  Peter Norvig,et al.  Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach , 1995 .

[5]  Judea Pearl,et al.  Probabilistic reasoning in intelligent systems - networks of plausible inference , 1991, Morgan Kaufmann series in representation and reasoning.

[6]  Felix Schlenk,et al.  Proof of Theorem 3 , 2005 .

[7]  Michael P. Wellman,et al.  Graphical Models for Groups: Belief Aggregation and Risk Sharing , 2005, Decis. Anal..

[8]  Thomas A. Rietz,et al.  Results from a Dozen Years of Election Futures Markets Research , 2008 .

[9]  Leslie G. Valiant,et al.  The Complexity of Enumeration and Reliability Problems , 1979, SIAM J. Comput..

[10]  C. Plott,et al.  Rational Expectations and the Aggregation of Diverse Information in Laboratory Security Markets , 1988 .

[11]  Michael P. Wellman,et al.  Betting boolean-style: a framework for trading in securities based on logical formulas , 2003, EC '03.

[12]  Robin Hanson,et al.  Combinatorial Information Market Design , 2003, Inf. Syst. Frontiers.

[13]  C. Genest,et al.  Further evidence against independence preservation in expert judgement synthesis , 1987 .

[14]  Thomas A. Rietz,et al.  Wishes, expectations and actions: a survey on price formation in election stock markets , 1999 .

[15]  Nancy L. Stokey,et al.  Information, Trade, and Common Knowledge , 1982 .

[16]  Lance Fortnow,et al.  Complexity of combinatorial market makers , 2008, EC '08.