Product Safety: Liability, R&D, and Signaling

The authors develop a monopoly model of product design and safety signaling incorporating a parametric liability specification. The firm first engages in RD injuries lead to losses which are allocated by the liability system. The authors vary the liability system's allocation of losses and trace out the implications for R&D investment and the price-safety relationship. Copyright 1995 by American Economic Association.

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