Electric Boolean Games: Redistribution Schemes for Resource-Bounded Agents

In Boolean games, agents uniquely control a set of propositional variables, and aim at achieving a goal formula whose realisation might depend on the choices the other agents make with respect tothe variables they control. We consider the case in which assigning a value to propositional variables incurs a cost, and moreover, we assume agents to be restricted in their choice of assignments by an initial endowment: they can only make choices with a lower cost than this endowment. We then consider the possibility that endowments can be redistributed among agents. Different redistributions may lead to Nash equilibrium outcomes with very different properties, and so certain redistributions may be considered more attractive than others. In this context we study centralised redistribution schemes, where a system designer is allowed to redistribute the initial energy endowment among the agents in order to achieve desirable systemic properties. We also show how to extend this basic model to a dynamic variant in which an electric Boolean game takes place over a series of rounds.

[1]  Sarit Kraus,et al.  Incentive Engineering for Boolean Games , 2011, IJCAI.

[2]  Marie-Christine Lagasquie-Schiex,et al.  Dependencies between players in Boolean games , 2007, Int. J. Approx. Reason..

[3]  Michael Wooldridge,et al.  On the computational complexity of coalitional resource games , 2006, Artif. Intell..

[4]  Brian Logan,et al.  Ascribing beliefs to resource bounded agents , 2002, AAMAS '02.

[5]  Michael Wooldridge,et al.  Iterated Boolean games , 2013, Inf. Comput..

[6]  Ariel Rubinstein,et al.  A Course in Game Theory , 1995 .

[7]  Michael Fisher,et al.  Executable specifications of resource-bounded agents , 2010, Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems.

[8]  E. Allen Emerson,et al.  Temporal and Modal Logic , 1991, Handbook of Theoretical Computer Science, Volume B: Formal Models and Sematics.

[9]  Zohar Manna,et al.  The Temporal Logic of Reactive and Concurrent Systems , 1991, Springer New York.

[10]  David J. Israel,et al.  Plans and resource‐bounded practical reasoning , 1988, Comput. Intell..

[11]  Sarit Kraus,et al.  Cooperative Boolean games , 2008, AAMAS.

[12]  Wolfgang Thomas,et al.  Handbook of Theoretical Computer Science, Volume B: Formal Models and Semantics , 1990 .

[13]  H. Moulin,et al.  Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory , 1982 .

[14]  Jérôme Lang,et al.  Compact preference representation and Boolean games , 2006, Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems.

[15]  Cees Witteveen,et al.  Boolean games , 2001 .

[16]  Zohar Manna,et al.  Temporal verification of reactive systems - safety , 1995 .

[17]  Marc Pauly,et al.  Logic for social software , 2000 .

[18]  Wojciech Jamroga,et al.  Strategic games and truly playable effectivity functions , 2013, Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems.

[19]  Thomas A. Henzinger,et al.  Resource Interfaces , 2003, EMSOFT.

[20]  Michael Wooldridge,et al.  Hard and soft equilibria in boolean games , 2014, AAMAS.

[21]  A. Prasad Sistla,et al.  The complexity of propositional linear temporal logics , 1982, STOC '82.

[22]  Piergiorgio Bertoli,et al.  Model-Checking Memory Requirements of Resource-Bounded Reasoners , 2006, AAAI.

[23]  Abdur Rakib,et al.  A Logic for Coalitions with Bounded Resources , 2009, IJCAI.