Subjective Probability and the Theory of Games

This paper explores some of the consequences of adopting a modern subjective view of probability for game theory. The consequences are substantial. The subjective view of probability clarifies the important distinction between normative and positive theorizing about behavior in games, a distinction that is often lost in the search for "solution concepts" which largely characterizes game theory since the work of von Neumann and Morgenstern. Many of the distinctions that appear important in conventional game theory two-person versus n-person, zero-sum versus variable sum appear unimportant in the subjective formulation. Other distinctions, such as single play versus repetitive-play games, appear to be more important in the subjective formulation than in the conventional formulation.

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