Taking as the starting point some concepts of mathematical logic, especially those of logical semantics (theory of models), I will try to elaborate and adjust them to the needs of the methodology of empirical sciences. Proceeding along these lines, I will aim at constructing a set-theoretic model of the relationships which connect the formal components of an empirical theory (its language and the set of asserted statements) with the empirical systems that the theory is to describe. The discussion will result in producing two such models. The second one will be devised in such a manner as to conform with the approximative nature of empirical inquiry. Inside this conceptual framework there will be defined and discussed several notions, among others some types of regularities (determinism, some correlation regularities) and the notion of approximative truth.
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