A Sampling Inspection Problem in Arms Control Agreements: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

Abstract : Many disarmament or arms-control agreements may be monitored by sample inspections. Unlike the usual sampling procedures, sampling for arms-control agreements must take into account the possibility that the statistical universe from which samples are to be drawn may be tampered with so as to decrease the probability of detection of a violation. A game-theoretic model is formulated for studying a sampling problem in which the inspector is allowed to examine a fixed number (usually small) of items or natural events (e.g., items from an assembly line under an agreement limiting military production, or seismic events under a nuclear test-ban agreement). It is assumed that the inspections are to be performed within a fixed time period or on a series of events of fixed length. Optimal sampling procedures are derived as functions of the number of inspections and the size of the statistical universe. Some variations on the model are briefly considered.