Analysis of coalition formation and cooperation strategies in mobile ad hoc networks

This paper focuses on the formal assessment of the properties of cooperation enforcement mechanisms used to detect and prevent selfish behavior of nodes forming a mobile ad hoc network. In the first part, we demonstrate the requirement for a cooperation enforcement mechanism using cooperative game theory that allows us to determine a lower bound on the size of coalitions of cooperating nodes. In the second part, using non-cooperative game theory, we compare our cooperation enforcement mechanism CORE to other popular mechanisms. Under the hypothesis of perfect monitoring of node behavior, CORE appears to be equivalent to a wide range of history-based strategies like tit-for-tat. Further, adopting a more realistic assumption taking into account imperfect monitoring due to probable communication errors, the non-cooperative model puts in evidence the superiority of CORE over other history-based schemes.

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