AnIntegrated Process ModelfortheSystems Development Requiring Simultaneous Consideration oftheSEProcess andSafety Requirements

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~2 Abstract -We areconcerned withthedevelopment ofcomplexmanagesafetyrequirements therein. A fundamental large-scale systems with safety-critical requirements. Therefore, we objective ofsystem safety istoidentify, eliminate orcontrol havetostudy howtosatisfy both thesystems engineering (SE) and anddocument system hazards (5). Assafety-critical systems safety requirements. Todoso,wedeveloped anintegrated process model forthesystems development byintegrating thestandard SE bec moen complinthisn stomcosider an is process fromISO/EC15288 andthehazard analysis techniques for approach when developing thosesystemssinceitis systems safety. Based ontheconcepts ofthesystems life cycle, the interdisciplinary andproviding a meanstoenablethe processes andassociated activities, themodel wasdesigned tohave realization ofsuccessful systems (4). Ithasbeenconceived hierarchical structure with three levels andwasrepresented bythe thatsystem safety engineering isanelement ofsystems enhanced functional flowblock diagrams (EFFBD's). Thethreeengineering involving theapplication ofscientific and levels arecalled thelife cycle view, theprocess view, andthe engineering principles forthetimely identification ofhazards activity viewfromthetopdownwards. Notethat theinterface andinitiation ofthose actions necessary toprevent orcontrol between theprocesses ofSEandsafety wasrealized intheprocesshazards within thesystem (5). Therefore, alltheactivities in viewsthat areatthesecond level ofthemodel. Inaddition, the connection withsafety havetobeadopted through thewhole traceability between each level canbeeasily maintained. A database schema wasobtained toreflect theintegrated process andthemodel system life cyclefromtheinitial system design concepts, wasimplemented byatool CORE®. Toverify thedeveloped model,detailed design, andtesting tosystemdisposal atthe asetofactions havebeencarried out, including timeline analysis, completion ofits useful life (5). unaddressed leaf-level requirements check, andtraceability check. As forsystems safety, Federal Aviation Administration Theconfirmed traceability canbeuseful later whentherequirement (FAA)defined anappropriate life cycle (LC)andsafety risk changes inwhich case amodification oftheexisting model wouldmanagement overtheLC fortheir acquisition management beeasy. Asaresult, theintegrated process modelspecifies the system (AMS)(7), (8). Thesafety risk management includes required processes andactivities ofSEandsafety, respectively, and safety assessment andplans tobecarried outineachphase also theinterface/interaction between them. Alltheprocesses and andalsodescribes thehazard analysis activities that mustbe activities arecarried outconcurrently anditeratively, performed overeachphaseofthesystemlifecycle. The Keywords -Systems Engineering (SE), SEProcess, Systems Lifedetails canbe foundintheguidepublished by FAA. Cycle, ISO/EC15288, Enhanced Functional FlowBlock DiagramAccording totheFAA guidance, theresults ofsafety risk (EFFBD),SystemsSafety, HazardAnalysis, Concurrent management mustbereflected inthesystems design (8). Engineering