Spoofing Resilient State Estimation for the Power Grid Using an Extended Kalman Filter

Real-time monitoring of a wide-area power grid network has become feasible with time-synchronized Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs). PMUs use GPS signals for time synchronization and are susceptible to GPS Spoofing Attacks (GSAs) since civilian GPS signals are unencrypted and have low signal power of 10−16 Watts. We propose a novel Spoofing-Resilient State Estimator (SR-SE) that fuses time-varying GPS and PMU measurements using an Extended Kalman Filter (EKF). We design our measurement model that relates the coupling between GPS and PMU measurements to improve the performance of SR-SE. We perform software as well as Hardware-In-the-Loop (HIL) simulations to validate SR-SE against GSAs. We conduct 100 Monte Carlo (MC) simulations with IEEE 14, IEEE 39, and Illinois 200-bus test systems in software simulations. In HIL simulation, we simulate and generate GPS-PMU integrated datasets for the IEEE 14-bus test system using Real-Time Digital Simulator, PMUs, and GPS clock.