An Experimental Study of Public Information in the Asymmetric Partnership Game

This article analyzes a laboratory experiment on the novel asymmetric partnership game with public information. In this game, two players jointly work on a project each period that only benefits one of them. The public signals are about who is likely to benefit in the future, and the main treatment variable is the informativeness of these signals. Behavior is shown to be best explained by a modification of the basin of attraction (as introduced in Dal Bo and Frechette 2011) to allow for state‐dependent beliefs. The public signals impact choices in the way that this theory predicts, and ultimately there is more effort when signals are more informative. Finally, a new way to investigate strategies in these types of games is considered, and it is shown that different states are used by subjects to use partial effort strategies.

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