Aperio: High Integrity Elections for Developing Countries

This article presents an ‘end-to-end' integrity verification mechanism for use in minimally equipped secret paper-ballot election environments. The scheme presented in this paper achieves high integrity properties without interfering with the traditional marking and tabulation procedures of paper-ballot elections. Officials and auditors can respectively generate and independently verify ‘end-to-end' audit trails, with office stationery and entirely without cryptographic or mathematic computations.

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