Object defense with preventive strike and false targets

In this paper, optimal strategies for the defender and the attacker are studied. The defender moves first, allocating its limited resources into three diverse measures: launching a preventive strike, building false targets, and protecting the genuine object. It is assumed that launching a preventive strike will expose the genuine object, thus during this measure the defender will not simultaneously build false targets. The attacker moves after observing the actions taken by the defender, allocating its resources into three measures: protecting its own base from a preventive strike, building false bases, and attacking the genuine object. For each of the defender's given strategies, the attacker tries to maximize the destruction probability of the genuine object. Comparing the expected vulnerability of the object, the defender decides whether to launch a preventive strike or build false targets. The strategies of the attacker and the defender are illustrated with numerical examples, and the optimal strategies are found.

[1]  David K. Y. Yau,et al.  Markov Game Analysis for Attack-Defense of Power Networks Under Possible Misinformation , 2013, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems.

[2]  Hongyu Chen,et al.  Maximal profit allocation considering external attacks and self-defense in grid computing , 2013, Proceedings of 2013 3rd International Conference on Computer Science and Network Technology.

[3]  Gregory Levitin,et al.  Is it wise to leave some false targets unprotected? , 2013, Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf..

[4]  Vicki M. Bier,et al.  Target-oriented utility theory for modeling the deterrent effects of counterterrorism , 2015, Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf..

[5]  Frank Yeong-Sung Lin,et al.  Effective Proactive and Reactive Defense Strategies against Malicious Attacks in a Virtualized Honeynet , 2013, J. Appl. Math..

[6]  Nageswara S. V. Rao,et al.  Game-Theoretic Analysis of Attack and Defense in Cyber-Physical Network Infrastructures , 2012 .

[7]  Gregory Levitin,et al.  Optimal defence of single object with imperfect false targets , 2011, J. Oper. Res. Soc..

[8]  Gregory Levitin,et al.  Defence and attack of systems with variable attacker system structure detection probability , 2010, J. Oper. Res. Soc..

[9]  Gregory Levitin,et al.  False targets vs. redundancy in homogeneous parallel systems , 2009, Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf..

[10]  Vicki M. Bier,et al.  Balancing Terrorism and Natural Disasters - Defensive Strategy with Endogenous Attacker Effort , 2007, Oper. Res..

[11]  Gregory Levitin,et al.  Protection vs. false targets in series systems , 2009, Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf..

[12]  Gregory Levitin,et al.  False targets efficiency in defense strategy , 2009, Eur. J. Oper. Res..

[13]  Gregory Levitin,et al.  Active vs. Passive Defense against a Strategic Attacker , 2011, IGTR.

[14]  Naixue Xiong,et al.  Design and Analysis of Multimodel-Based Anomaly Intrusion Detection Systems in Industrial Process Automation , 2015, IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics: Systems.

[15]  Rui Peng,et al.  Defense and attack of performance-sharing common bus systems , 2017, Eur. J. Oper. Res..

[16]  G. Tullock Efficient Rent Seeking , 2001 .

[17]  Kjell Hausken and Gregory Levitin Review of Systems Defense and Attack Models , 2012, International Journal of Performability Engineering.

[18]  Gil Merom The Logic and Illogic of an Israeli Unilateral Preventive Strike on Iran , 2017 .

[19]  Gregory Levitin,et al.  Redundancy vs. Protection vs. False Targets for Systems Under Attack , 2009, IEEE Transactions on Reliability.

[20]  Kjell Hausken,et al.  Endogenizing the sticks and carrots: modeling possible perverse effects of counterterrorism measures , 2011, Ann. Oper. Res..

[21]  Shouhuai Xu,et al.  Multiple cyber attacks against a target with observation errors and dependent outcomes: Characterization and optimization , 2017, Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf..

[22]  Gregory Levitin,et al.  Preventive Strike vs. Protection in Defense Strategy , 2010 .

[23]  Subhayu Bandyopadhyay,et al.  The Interplay between Preemptive and Defensive Counterterrorism Measures: A Two‐Stage Game , 2008 .

[24]  Gregory Levitin,et al.  Defending a single object against an attacker trying to detect a subset of false targets , 2016, Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf..

[25]  Ferenc Szidarovszky,et al.  Incorporating risk seeking attitude into defense strategy , 2014, Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf..

[26]  Kjell Hausken,et al.  Governments' and Terrorists' Defense and Attack in a T-Period Game , 2011, Decis. Anal..

[27]  Gregory Levitin,et al.  Shield versus sword resource distribution in K-round duels , 2011, Central Eur. J. Oper. Res..

[28]  Gregory Levitin and Kjell Hausken Preventive Strike vs. False Targets in Defense Strategy , 2012 .

[29]  Gregory Levitin,et al.  Preventive strike vs. false targets and protection in defense strategy , 2011, Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf..

[30]  Jose Emmanuel Ramirez-Marquez,et al.  Protecting critical infrastructures against intentional attacks: a two-stage game with incomplete information , 2013 .

[31]  Wei Wang,et al.  A Survivability Quantitative Analysis Model for Network System Based on Attack Graph , 2007, 2007 International Conference on Machine Learning and Cybernetics.

[32]  J. W. Herrmann,et al.  Game-Theoretic Analysis of Attack and Defense in Cyber-Physical Network Infrastructures , 2012 .

[33]  Chi Zhang,et al.  Critical infrastructure protection using secrecy - A discrete simultaneous game , 2015, Eur. J. Oper. Res..