Strategic behavior of experienced subjects in a common pool resource game

Abstract. This paper describes the results of an experiment applying the strategy method to analyze the behavior of subjects in an 8-player common pool resource (CPR) game. The CPR game consists of a constituent game played for 20 periods. The CPR game has a unique optimum and a unique subgame perfect equilibrium; the latter involves overinvestment in the appropriation from the CPR. Sixteen students, all experienced in game theory, were recruited to play the CPR game over the course of 6 weeks. In the first phase of the experiment, they played the CPR game on-line 3 times. In the second phase of the experiment, the tournament phase, they designed strategies which were then played against each other. At the aggregate level, subgame perfect equilibrium organizes the data fairly well. At the individual level, however, fewer than 5% of subjects play in accordance with the game equilibrium prediction.

[1]  George Monbiot.  The Tragedy of Enclosure , 1994 .

[2]  R. Selten.  The chain store paradox , 1978 .

[3]  Margaret McKeans.  The Question of the Commons: The Culture and Ecology of Communal Resources. Edited by Bonnie J. McCay and James M . Acheson. Tucson University of Arizona Press, 1987. xvi + 349 pp. Tables, graphs, footnotes, bibliography index.$ 35.00 , 1990 .

[4]  E. Ostrom,et al.  Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources , 1994 .

[5]  R. Gardner,et al.  Probabilistic Destruction of Common-Pool Resources: Experimental Evidence , 1992 .

[6]  R. Hinde,et al.  The Possibility of Cooperation@@@Cooperation: The Basis of Sociability.@@@Cooperation and Prosocial Behavior.@@@Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. , 1990 .

[7]  B. Jones.  BOUNDED RATIONALITY , 1999 .

[8]  G. Hardin,et al.  The Tragedy of the Commons , 1968, Green Planet Blues.

[9]  James M. Acheson,et al.  The Question of the Commons: The Culture and Ecology of Communal Resources , 1989 .

[10]  S. Gordon,et al.  The economic theory of a common-property resource: The fishery , 1991 .

[11]  H. Gordon,et al.  The economic theory of a common-property resource: The fishery , 1954, Journal of Political Economy.

[12]  W. Hamilton,et al.  The evolution of cooperation. , 1984, Science.

[13]  Claudia Keser,et al.  Experimental Duopoly Markets with Demand Inertia , 1992 .

[14]  J. Ledyard.  Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research , 1994 .

[15]  Ken Binmore,et al.  Fun and games : a text on game theory , 1991 .

[16]  Reinhard Selten,et al.  A simple model of imperfect competition, where 4 are few and 6 are many , 1973 .

[17]  R. Selten,et al.  Duopoly Strategies Programmed by Experienced Players , 1997 .