Dynamic belief revision operators

The AGM approach to belief change is not geared to provide a decent account of iterated belief change. Darwiche and Pearl have sought to extend the AGM proposal in an interesting way to deal with this problem. We show that the original Darwiche-Pearl approach is, on the one hand excessively strong and, on the other rather limited in scope. The later Darwiche-Pearl approach, we argue, although it addresses the first problem, still remains rather permissive. We address both these issues by (1) assuming a dynamic revision operator that changes to a new revision operator after each instance of belief change, and (2) strengthening the Darwiche-Pearl proposal. Moreover, we provide constructions of this dynamic revision operator via entrenchment kinematics as well as a simple form of lexicographic revision, and prove representation results connecting these accounts.

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