The joint exploitation of a productive asset: a game-theoretic approach

SummaryIn the present paper we explore the set of equilibria in a game-theoretic model in which players can jointly exploit a productive asset. As in repeated games, we find that under certain circumstances there may be efficient as well as inefficient equilibria. In the model we study, efficient trigger-strategy equilibria may exist from some starting states (stocks of assets) but not others. More precisely, there is a stock level, sayy′, such that an efficient trigger-strategy equilibrium exists from starting stocks greater than or equal toy′, but not from those strictly less thany′. (This statement is meant to include the cases in whichy′ is zero or infinite.) Under some circumstances, there may exist a new kind of equilibrium, which we call aswitching equilibrium. We show that, in our model, whenever y′ is positive (and finite), there is an open intervalI with upper endpoint y′ such that, from any starting stock inI there is an equilibrium of the dynamic game with the following structure: the players follow an inefficient but growing path until the stock reaches the levely′, and then follow an (efficient) trigger strategy after that. The use of a continuous-time model enables us to conveniently decouple the delay of information from the time interval between decisions.