Controlled physical random functions and applications

The cryptographic protocols that we use in everyday life rely on the secure storage of keys in consumer devices. Protecting these keys from invasive attackers, who open a device to steal its key, is a challenging problem. We propose controlled physical random functions (CPUFs) as an alternative to storing keys and describe the core protocols that are needed to use CPUFs. A physical random functions (PUF) is a physical system with an input and output. The functional relationship between input and output looks like that of a random function. The particular relationship is unique to a specific instance of a PUF, hence, one needs access to a particular PUF instance to evaluate the function it embodies. The cryptographic applications of a PUF are quite limited unless the PUF is combined with an algorithm that limits the ways in which the PUF can be evaluated; this is a CPUF. A major difficulty in using CPUFs is that you can only know a small set of outputs of the PUF—the unknown outputs being unrelated to the known ones. We present protocols that get around this difficulty and allow a chain of trust to be established between the CPUF manufacturer and a party that wishes to interact securely with the PUF device. We also present some elementary applications, such as certified execution.

[1]  Amy Carroll,et al.  Microsoft Palladium: A Business Overview , 2002 .

[2]  G. Edward Suh,et al.  Extracting secret keys from integrated circuits , 2005, IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems.

[3]  Srinivas Devadas,et al.  Controlled physical random functions , 2002 .

[4]  Siva Sai Yerubandi,et al.  Differential Power Analysis , 2002 .

[5]  Srinivas Devadas,et al.  Identification and authentication of integrated circuits , 2004, Concurr. Pract. Exp..

[6]  Dan Boneh,et al.  Architectural support for copy and tamper resistant software , 2000, SIGP.

[7]  Srinivas Devadas,et al.  Controlled physical random functions , 2002, 18th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, 2002. Proceedings..

[8]  Blaise L. P. Gassend,et al.  Physical random functions , 2003 .

[9]  Srinivas Devadas,et al.  Knowledge Flow Analysis for Security Protocols , 2005, ArXiv.

[10]  Bennet S. Yee,et al.  Using Secure Coprocessors , 1994 .

[11]  Ravi Sandhu,et al.  ACM Transactions on Information and System Security: Editorial , 2005 .

[12]  Markus G. Kuhn,et al.  Tamper resistance: a cautionary note , 1996 .

[13]  DevadasSrinivas,et al.  Controlled physical random functions and applications , 2008 .

[14]  R. Pappu,et al.  Physical One-Way Functions , 2002, Science.

[15]  T. Alves,et al.  TrustZone : Integrated Hardware and Software Security , 2004 .

[16]  Markus G. Kuhn,et al.  Low Cost Attacks on Tamper Resistant Devices , 1997, Security Protocols Workshop.

[17]  G. Edward Suh,et al.  AEGIS: architecture for tamper-evident and tamper-resistant processing , 2003, ICS.

[18]  Peter Gutmann,et al.  Secure deletion of data from magnetic and solid-state memory , 1996 .

[19]  Sean W. Smith,et al.  Building a high-performance, programmable secure coprocessor , 1999, Comput. Networks.

[20]  Stephen A. Benton,et al.  Physical one-way functions , 2001 .

[21]  Srinivas Devadas,et al.  Identification and authentication of integrated circuits: Research Articles , 2004 .

[22]  Trevor York,et al.  Book Review: Principles of CMOS VLSI Design: A Systems Perspective , 1986 .

[23]  Boris Skoric,et al.  Information-Theoretic Security Analysis of Physical Uncloneable Functions , 2005, Financial Cryptography.

[24]  Marten van Dijk,et al.  A technique to build a secret key in integrated circuits for identification and authentication applications , 2004, 2004 Symposium on VLSI Circuits. Digest of Technical Papers (IEEE Cat. No.04CH37525).

[25]  Boris Skoric,et al.  Robust Key Extraction from Physical Uncloneable Functions , 2005, ACNS.

[26]  Daniel Jackson.  Automating first-order relational logic , 2000, SIGSOFT '00/FSE-8.

[27]  Ross J. Anderson.  Security engineering - a guide to building dependable distributed systems (2. ed.) , 2001 .

[28]  Daniel Jackson,et al.  Alloy: a lightweight object modelling notation , 2002, TSEM.

[29]  David Chinnery,et al.  Closing the gap between ASIC & custom , 2002 .

[30]  Kamran Eshraghian,et al.  Principles of CMOS VLSI Design: A Systems Perspective , 1985 .

[31]  G. Edward Suh,et al.  Design and Implementation of the AEGIS Single-Chip Secure Processor Using Physical Random Functions , 2005, ISCA 2005.

[32]  Srinivas Devadas,et al.  Silicon physical random functions , 2002, CCS '02.

[33]  G. Edward Suh,et al.  Caches and hash trees for efficient memory integrity verification , 2003, The Ninth International Symposium on High-Performance Computer Architecture, 2003. HPCA-9 2003. Proceedings..