How experts think about counterfactuals in business history: The role of theoretical commitments and disciplinary perspectives

Abstract Past work in politically charged domains has revealed a blame-game dynamic in how historical observers think about counterfactual scenarios. Our working hypothesis, however, is that business historians will prove less ideologically polarized into rival communities of co-believers and more likely to treat disputes over causation as matters of degree. Early data indicate that, although exceptions exist, counterfactual reasoning about business history is indeed moderated by widespread faith that: (a) it is difficult to delay the advance of scientific knowledge and its translation into useful technology; (b) quasi-rational actors operating in competitive markets will bring history back onto the ‘equilibrium path’ quite quickly.We trace these differences to the weaker incentives for finger-pointing, the stronger influence of sociology-of-science work documenting the commonness of ‘multiples’ in discovery, and the predominance of economic and game-theoretic models.

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