The VCG Mechanism for Bayesian Scheduling
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] Tim Roughgarden,et al. Revenue submodularity , 2009, EC '09.
[2] Elias Koutsoupias,et al. A Lower Bound of 1+φ for Truthful Scheduling Mechanisms , 2012, Algorithmica.
[3] Tim Roughgarden,et al. Supply-limiting mechanisms , 2012, EC '12.
[4] Itai Ashlagi,et al. Optimal Lower Bounds for Anonymous Scheduling Mechanisms , 2012, Math. Oper. Res..
[5] Nikhil R. Devanur,et al. Prior-Independent Multi-parameter Mechanism Design , 2011, WINE.
[6] Rajeev Motwani,et al. Randomized algorithms , 1996, CSUR.
[7] Balasubramanian Sivan,et al. Prior robust optimization , 2013 .
[8] E. H. Clarke. Multipart pricing of public goods , 1971 .
[9] Jan Karel Lenstra,et al. Approximation algorithms for scheduling unrelated parallel machines , 1987, 28th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (sfcs 1987).
[10] Chaitanya Swamy,et al. Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity , 2009, Games Econ. Behav..
[11] Martin Raab,et al. "Balls into Bins" - A Simple and Tight Analysis , 1998, RANDOM.
[12] Pinyan Lu,et al. On 2-Player Randomized Mechanisms for Scheduling , 2009, WINE.
[13] Noam Nisan,et al. Algorithmic Mechanism Design , 2001, Games Econ. Behav..
[14] Theodore Groves,et al. Incentives in Teams , 1973 .
[15] Changyuan Yu,et al. Truthful mechanisms for two-range-values variant of unrelated scheduling , 2009, Theor. Comput. Sci..
[16] A. W. Marshall,et al. Properties of Probability Distributions with Monotone Hazard Rate , 1963 .
[17] Leslie A. Hall,et al. Approximation algorithms for scheduling , 1996 .
[18] Changyuan Yu,et al. Randomized Truthful Mechanisms for Scheduling Unrelated Machines , 2008, WINE.
[19] Noam Nisan,et al. Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms , 2000, EC '00.
[20] Elias Koutsoupias,et al. A Lower Bound for Scheduling Mechanisms , 2007, SODA '07.
[21] William Vickrey,et al. Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders , 1961 .
[22] Nicole Immorlica,et al. On the limits of black-box reductions in mechanism design , 2012, STOC '12.
[23] Shuchi Chawla,et al. Prior-independent mechanisms for scheduling , 2013, STOC '13.
[24] Tim Roughgarden,et al. Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents , 2011, SIAM J. Comput..
[25] Zengjian Hu,et al. On weighted balls-into-bins games , 2005, Theor. Comput. Sci..
[26] S. Matthew Weinberg,et al. Bayesian Truthful Mechanisms for Job Scheduling from Bi-criterion Approximation Algorithms , 2014, SODA.
[27] Annamária Kovács,et al. A Deterministic Truthful PTAS for Scheduling Related Machines , 2013, SIAM J. Comput..
[28] Tim Roughgarden,et al. Revenue maximization with a single sample , 2015, Games Econ. Behav..
[29] Yiannis Giannakopoulos,et al. The VCG Mechanism for Bayesian Scheduling , 2015, WINE.
[30] Changyuan Yu,et al. An Improved Randomized Truthful Mechanism for Scheduling Unrelated Machines , 2008, STACS.
[31] T. Aven. Upper (lower) bounds on the mean of the maximum (minimum) of a number of random variables , 1985, Journal of Applied Probability.
[32] Éva Tardos,et al. Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents , 2001, Proceedings 2001 IEEE International Conference on Cluster Computing.
[33] Tim Roughgarden,et al. Simple versus optimal mechanisms , 2009, SECO.