Large shareholders, bank ownership and informativeness of earnings

This paper analyses the influence of large shareholders and bank ownership on earnings informativeness, measured by the earnings-return relation, in Spain. The results suggest that the expropriation effect is dominant at any level of ownership concentration. Furthermore, bank ownership is positively associated with the explanatory power of earnings for returns, being consistent with the role of banks as shareholders that actively monitor the firm’s business performance. This effect is similar regardless of whether the bank is the major shareholder of the firm or not.

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