A reputation mechanism for layered communities

The exchange of digital goods via peer-to-peer (P2P) systems is a challenging problem for e-commerce. Participants rarely know each other, and may be completely anonymous, so the self-interest of the participants works against trust and they miss out on the benefits of cooperation. Reputation mechanisms help to remedy selfish misbehaviour. In this paper a new layered reputation mechanism establishes a trusted P2P environment, with bad content filtered out and novel content continuously introduced, by giving appropriate incentives to participants. A simulation was created and experiments run to validate the design.

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