Lobbying of accounting standard-setting bodies in the U.K. and the U.S.A.: A Downsian analysis

Abstract This paper examines the response of those affected by financial accounting standards to new accounting rules. The efforts of individuals and organizations to promote or obstruct such rules are described collectively as lobbying. The Downsian voting model provides the framework for the discussion of important aspects of lobbying, namely the characteristics of lobbyists, the timing of their lobbying and the methods they are likely to employ. The analysis is illustrated with examples drawn from U.K. and U.S. experience of standard-setting.

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