Reading and Warning the Likely Enemy: China's Signals to the United States about Vietnam in 1965

Vietnam War reached a critical juncture early in 1965 when the People's Republic of China warned the United States, which had launched Operation Rolling Thunder, the massive and continuous bombardment of North Vietnam, that if it continued to escalate its military involvement, China would do everything necessary, even at the risk of a major confrontation, to 'assist Vietnam and resist America'.1 China and the United States appeared to be on course for a military showdown liable to prove as costly as the war between them in Korea from 1950 to 1953. China sent its warning, which took the form of a number of signals, through various channels. Both China and the United States tried in such signalling to demonstrate both determination and preparedness to support their Vietnamese allies and their hope of avoiding another direct SinoAmerican military clash. In dealing with each other, both states combined firm rhetoric with cautious action. Each tried to understand the signals sent by the other, and each took account of the other's possible responses when making strategic decisions. As a result, despite the escalation of the Vietnam War after the spring of 1965 as both reinforced their allies with personnel and supplies, the Korean War experience was not repeated. Sino-American signalling in 1965 represents a crucial episode in the history of the cold war. The successful steps taken by both sides to avoid a second Sino-American war marked a subtle yet significant change in their relations. It helped to instil in the two ideological and geopolitical rivals a degree of mutual caution and, as a result, mutual confidence that proved to be a turning point on the path from confrontation to rapprochement. Thus, the story has implications for international relations theories of conflict control, inter-belligerent communications, and the value of