Reciprocity and Norms in U.S.-Soviet Foreign Policy

This study examines the nature of U.S.-Soviet relations over the past 4 decades. The authors focus especially on the 1980s. There has been a marked shift in U.S.-Soviet conflictual and cooperative foreign policy behavior subsequent to Gorbachev's rise to power. The authors explore quantitatively the changes in conflictual and cooperative behavior in the context of reciprocity and evolving norms. Using event data from 1948 through 1988, they analyze the role of reciprocity in U.S.-Soviet relations as well as the nature of underlying norms that set broad parameters for U.S.-Soviet foreign policy behavior. Time-varying parameter estimates of memory and reactivity for both countries, as well as the interaction propensities of successive heads of state, suggest an increase in cooperation and a leveling off of hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union since 1985.

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