Finite Depth of Reasoning and Equilibrium Play in Games with Incomplete Information

The standard framework for analyzing games with incomplete information models players as if they have an innite depth of reasoning. This paper generalizes the type spaces of Harsanyi (1967{1968) so that players can have a nite depth of reasoning. We

[1]  Miguel A. Costa-Gomes,et al.  Structural Models of Nonequilibrium Strategic Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications , 2013 .

[2]  A. Heifetz,et al.  All Types Naive and Canny , 2012 .

[3]  W. Kets Bounded Reasoning and Higher-Order Uncertainty , 2012 .

[4]  Martin Meier,et al.  On the relationship between hierarchy and type morphisms , 2011 .

[5]  Tomasz Strzalecki,et al.  Depth of Reasoning and Higher Order Beliefs , 2010 .

[6]  H. Jerome Keisler,et al.  Iterated dominance revisited , 2010, Economic Theory.

[7]  Chun-Lei Yang,et al.  An Explicit Approach to Modeling Finite-Order Type Spaces and Applications , 2009 .

[8]  Colin Camerer,et al.  Measuring Attention and Strategic Behavior in Games with Private Information , 2009 .

[9]  Thomas R. Palfrey,et al.  Heterogeneous quantal response equilibrium and cognitive hierarchies , 2006, J. Econ. Theory.

[10]  Pierpaolo Battigalli,et al.  Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information , 2008 .

[11]  V. Crawford,et al.  Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions? , 2007 .

[12]  Muhamet Yildiz,et al.  A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements , 2007 .

[13]  D. Fudenberg,et al.  Interim Correlated Rationalizability , 2007 .

[14]  H. Jerome Keisler,et al.  An Impossibility Theorem on Beliefs in Games , 2006, Stud Logica.

[15]  Stephen Morris,et al.  Topologies on Types , 2005 .

[16]  Philippe Jehiel,et al.  Analogy-based expectation equilibrium , 2004, J. Econ. Theory.

[17]  Drew Fudenberg,et al.  Learning to Play Bayesian Games , 2001, Games Econ. Behav..

[18]  A. Heifetz,et al.  Topology-Free Typology of Beliefs , 1998 .

[19]  Colin Camerer,et al.  Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best-Response in Experimental P-Beauty Contests , 1998 .

[20]  Miguel A. Costa-Gomes,et al.  Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study , 1998 .

[21]  Robin I. M. Dunbar,et al.  Theory-of-mind deficits and causal attributions , 1998 .

[22]  Stephen Morris,et al.  Depth of knowledge and the effect of higher order uncertainty , 1995 .

[23]  D. Stahl,et al.  On Players' Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence , 1995 .

[24]  Eddie Dekel,et al.  Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge , 1993 .

[25]  M. Ershov Extension of Measures and Stochastic Equations , 1975 .

[26]  R. Aumann,et al.  Unraveling in Guessing Games : An Experimental Study , 2007 .

[27]  Jeffrey C. Ely CRITICAL TYPES , 2007 .

[28]  Drew Fudenberg,et al.  Topologies on Type , 2006 .

[29]  Kim C. Border,et al.  Infinite Dimensional Analysis: A Hitchhiker’s Guide , 1994 .

[30]  Sylvain Sorin,et al.  Repeated Games. Part A: Background Material , 1994 .

[31]  A. Rubinstein The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior Under "Almost Common Knowledge" , 1989 .

[32]  S. Zamir,et al.  Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information , 1985 .