Multi-party governance: Managing the unity-distinctiveness dilemma in executive coalitions

In democracies where no party enjoys a parliamentary majority, various multi-party governance arrangements have evolved to accommodate the respective interests of the parties involved. Such arrangements reflect, among other things, the political imperatives facing the parties in question, in particular the quest for an effective and durable government (which typically requires significant inter-party discipline) and the competing desire for parties to retain their distinctiveness in order to protect their electoral support (which implies less discipline). In New Zealand, efforts to balance governmental unity and party distinctiveness have generated several innovative solutions, including agree-to-disagree provisions in coalition agreements and hybrid arrangements enabling minor parties to participate within the executive while being free of the usual conventions of collective cabinet responsibility. This article explores the origins, nature, merits and impact of the recent developments in New Zealand, and their implications for the study of coalition government.

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