Game Theory and the Evolution of Meaning

Evolutionary game theory is a general, but mathematically precise framework for modeling the competition between and fitness-based selection of different types of behavior. We review recent applications of this framework to account for the evolution of behavior that lends meaning to ostensible acts and signs.

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