Research on Fuzzy Cooperative Game Model of Allocation of Pollution Discharge Rights

The allocation of pollution rights is significant to the economic development of a region, which determines the industrial structure of the region in another way. This study established an allocation model based on fuzzy coalition game theory. Formation of fuzzy coalitions between many producers in a region and reallocation of pollution discharge rights in the region through these coalitions was used to increase the total production value of the region while total pollution discharge amount is constant. At the same time, the fuzzy Shapley value method was used to allocate benefits obtained from the cooperation to the participants in various coalitions. This model was validated by its application in the case of three production bases near the Shizi channel in Dongguan city for reallocation of pollution discharge rights. Results showed that this model could increase the coalition benefits of the three production bases in this region, which observed increases of 4.28%, 7.74%, and 13.98%, respectively.

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