Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] Markus Kinateder,et al. Delayed perfect monitoring in repeated games , 2013, Int. J. Game Theory.
[2] Johannes Hörner,et al. The folk theorem for games with private almost-perfect monitoring , 2005 .
[3] Christian Thöni,et al. Trust, voluntary cooperation, and socio-economic background: survey and experimental evidence , 2004 .
[4] Drew Fudenberg,et al. Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring , 2007 .
[5] Glenn Ellison. Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching , 1994 .
[6] D. Fudenberg,et al. Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2011 with Funding from Working Paper Department of Economics the Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information , 2022 .
[7] P. Dutta. A Folk Theorem for Stochastic Games , 1995 .
[8] Takuo Sugaya. Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring , 2011 .
[9] Elchanan Ben-Porath,et al. Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring , 2003, Games Econ. Behav..
[10] Olivier Compte. Communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring , 1998 .
[11] Ichiro Obara. Folk theorem with communication , 2009, J. Econ. Theory.
[12] Yuliy Sannikov,et al. Games with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time , 2007 .
[13] Juan F. Escobar,et al. Efficiency in Games with Markovian Private Information , 2013 .
[14] Drew Fudenberg,et al. Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal , 2011, Games Econ. Behav..
[15] Johannes Hörner,et al. How Robust is the Folk Theorem , 2009 .
[16] L. Toledo-Pereyra. Trust , 2006, Mediation Behaviour.
[17] Yehuda Levy,et al. Stochastic games with information lag , 2012, Games Econ. Behav..
[18] J. Bergin,et al. Continuous Time Repeated Games , 1993 .
[19] D. Fudenberg,et al. Repeated Games with Frequent Signals , 2009 .
[20] Drew Fudenberg,et al. The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games , 2007, J. Econ. Theory.
[21] Andrzej Skrzypacz,et al. Impossibility of Collusion Under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production , 2005 .
[22] Michihiro Kandori,et al. Private Observation, Communication and Collusion , 1998 .
[23] Ariel Rubinstein,et al. Equilibrium in Supergames , 1994, Essays in Game Theory.
[24] Bin Jiang,et al. Trigger Strategy Equilibriums in Stochastic Differential Games with Information Time Lags: An Analysis of Cooperative Production Strategies , 2011, SIAM J. Control. Optim..
[25] Drew Fudenberg,et al. The Folk Theorem for Irreducible Stochastic Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring , 2010, J. Econ. Theory.
[26] Yuliy Sannikov,et al. Reputation in Continuous‐Time Games , 2011 .
[27] Johannes Horner,et al. Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for δ → 1 and a Folk Theorem , 2010 .
[28] Drew Fudenberg,et al. The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information , 1986 .
[29] David Pearce,et al. Information and timing in repeated partnerships , 1991 .
[30] Stephen Morris,et al. Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring , 2002, J. Econ. Theory.
[31] Robert J. Aumann,et al. Long-Term Competition - A Game-Theoretic Analysis , 1994, Essays in Game Theory.
[32] Nicolas Vieille,et al. Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for delta Approaching 1 and a Folk Theorem , 2010 .
[33] Andrzej Skrzypacz,et al. THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN REPEATED GAMES WITH FREQUENT ACTIONS , 2010 .
[34] Juan F. Escobar,et al. A FOLK THEOREM WITH MARKOVIAN PRIVATE INFORMATION , 2009 .
[35] J. Friedman. A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames , 1971 .
[36] Nimrod Megiddo,et al. Essays in Game Theory, In Honor of Michael Maschler , 1994, Essays in Game Theory.
[37] E. Ostrom,et al. Trust and reciprocity : interdisciplinary lessons from experimental research , 2003 .
[38] Tadashi Sekiguchi. Efficiency in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring , 1997 .
[39] E. Stacchetti,et al. Towards a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring , 1990 .
[40] Yuichi Yamamoto. A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games , 2009, J. Econ. Theory.