Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts

PCT No. PCT/EP92/02630 Sec. 371 Date Oct. 19, 1994 Sec. 102(e) Date Oct. 19, 1994 PCT Filed Nov. 16, 1992 PCT Pub. No. WO93/13605 PCT Pub. Date Jul. 8, 1993This invention relates to apparatus and a method for provision of diversity in reception in a communications system such as the GSM cellular radio system. A received call of low quality is received through a first of two antennas (15, 16) and through first of a plurality of receivers (10-14). A spare receiver that is not required for receipt of a call is identified and the spare receiver is switched to receive the call through the second antenna. The spare receiver is tuned to the frequency of the call of low quality and the calls are diversity combined through the first receiver and the spare receiver.

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