Detection of Algebraic Manipulation in the Presence of Leakage

We investigate the problem of algebraic manipulation detection (AMD) over a communication channel that partially leaks information to an adversary. We assume the adversary is computationally unbounded and there is no shared key or correlated randomness between the sender and the receiver. We introduce leakage-resilient (LR)-AMD codes to detect algebraic manipulation in this model.

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